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Abstract We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operat-
ing in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare.
If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an
increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of others. If price effects
are drastic, the welfare of all household members moves in the same direction when
bargaining power shifts, at the expense (or for the benefit) of outside consumers. Typ-
ically a shift of bargaining power within a set of households also impacts upon other
households. We show that each individual of a sociological group tends to benefit, if
he can increase his bargaining power, but suffers if others in his group do the same.
1 Introduction
Societies often experience a shift of bargaining power in households. For instance,
ceteris paribus, a shift of bargaining power in favor of the female partner has taken
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place over the last decades. Such a shift induces a change in household demand for
goods and services. In turn, market clearing might occur at different prices and, con-
sequently, the terms of trade for households might be altered.
It is the consequences, not the causes of shifts in intra-household bargaining power
that interest us here. We are concerned with pure economic (positive) effects on the
allocation of resources, as well as welfare (normative) effects at both the individual
and societal levels. We are going to study those effects in a general equilibrium con-
text. Our study reveals that the magnitude of equilibrium price responses to a shift of
intra-household bargaining power matters. If price effects are sufficiently small, then
typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power—necessarily to
the detriment of others. In particular, the other member(s) of the household will lose.
In contrast, if price effects are drastic, then the members of the individual’s household
all benefit or are all harmed. Typically a shift of bargaining power within a set of
households also impacts upon other households. We show that each individual of a
sociological group tends to benefit if he can increase his bargaining power, but suffers
if others in his group enjoy more bargaining power. For quasi-linear preferences, how-
ever, a change of the bargaining power within a particular household only impacts on
the distribution of the numéraire in the household under consideration without affect-
ing the consumption of other commodities. A local change of bargaining power has
no price effect and does not affect the utility of individuals in other households.
The underlying model of the household satisfies collective rationality in the sense of
Chiappori (1988a, 1992).1 It departs from traditional economic theory which has, for
the most part, treated households as if they were single consumers. The model admits
households with several, typically heterogeneous members who have individual pref-
erences. A household takes market prices as given and makes an efficient consumption
choice (in terms of the preferences of its members) subject to its budget constraint.
Different households may use different collective decision mechanisms. This depar-
ture from the traditional market model enables us to investigate the interplay of dual
roles of households: households as collective decision making units on the one hand
and as competitive market participants on the other hand.
The current model starts from the general equilibrium model in Haller (2000) where
the household structure is fixed.2 We specialize by assuming that the efficient collec-
tive household decision is the result of (possibly asymmetric) Nash bargaining within
the household. This feature allows us to parametrize relative bargaining power, to per-
form comparative statics and to answer the question at hand, how a shift of bargaining
power within households affects equilibrium allocation and welfare.
The model is introduced in the next section. In Sect. 3, we focus on a two-person
household embedded in a larger economy and study how a shift of bargaining power
within that household affects the consumption and welfare of its members. We decom-
pose the intra-household effects into two relevant effects, a pure bargaining effect and
a price effect. We focus in this section on negligible price effects.
1 See also the surveys by Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992, 1994).
2 See Gersbach and Haller (2001, 2002) for versions with variable household structure.
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In Sect. 4, we exemplify the different scenarios when price effects may be drastic.
We go through a sequence of representative examples, with a two-person household
and a one-person household, and examine the general equilibrium implications of a
shift of bargaining power within the two-person household. We observe that at least
one member is always affected by a shift of bargaining power within the two-person
household, but that the non-member may be affected as well. We observe further that
price effects may be drastic if preferences exhibit little substitutability. We should
mention that the findings for these two-household economies are also valid for respec-
tive replica economies obtained from the representative examples, provided that each
of the two-person households of the replica economy undergoes the same shift of
intra-household bargaining power. These shifts constitute a particular instance of a
widespread shift of bargaining power in favor of a specific sociological group.
In Sect. 5, we investigate in more detail shifts of bargaining power in favor of
a specific sociological group, with added emphasis on inter-household or spill-over
effects. We distinguish between “first members” and “second members” of house-
holds. With particular consumer characteristics, spill-overs are absent: The effects of
a change of bargaining power within a household are confined to that household. With
different consumer characteristics, spill-overs can occur exactly as described earlier.
For instance, a first member of a household benefits from an increase in own bargain-
ing power, but loses if ceteris paribus first members of other households gain more
bargaining power. In Sect. 6, we allow for price-dependent outside options. In Sect. 7,
we offer concluding remarks.
2 General equilibrium model
We consider a finite pure exchange economy. The main departure from the traditional
model is that a household can have several members, each with their own preferences.
Fixed household structure
The population is divided into finitely many households h = 1, . . . , n, with n ≥ 2.
Each household h consists of finitely many members i = hm with m = 1, . . . , m(h),
m(h) ≥ 1. Put I = {hm : h = 1, . . . , n; m = 1, . . . , m(h)}, the finite population of
individuals to be considered.
Commodities, endowments, and individual preferences
The commodity space is R with  ≥ 1. Household h is endowed with a commodity
bundle ωh ∈ R, ωh > 0. The aggregate or social endowment is ω = ∑h ωh . A
generic individual i = hm ∈ I has:
• consumption set Xi = R+;
• preferences  i on the allocation space X ≡
∏
j∈I X j represented by a utility
function Ui : X −→ R.
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The consumption bundle of a generic individual i is denoted by xi . Let x = (xi ), y =
(yi ) denote generic elements of X . For h = 1, . . . , n, define Xh = ∏m(h)m=1 Xhm
with generic elements xh = (xh1, . . . , xhm(h)). If x ∈ X is an allocation, then for
h = 1, . . . , n, household consumption is given by xh = (xh1, . . . , xhm(h)) ∈ Xh .
We will allow for the possibility of consumption externalities. Following Haller
(2000), we shall restrict attention to the case where such consumption externalities, if
any, exist only between members of the same household. This is captured by the notion
of intra-household externalities where utility functions are restricted to the household
consumption xh, i.e.:
(E1) Intra-household externalities: Ui (x) = Ui (xh) for i = hm, x ∈ X .
A special case is the absence of externalities. When there are no externalities, the
utility function of an individual i depends only on his consumption bundle xi , i.e.
(E2) Absence of externalities: Ui (x) = Ui (xi ) for i = hm, x = (xi ) ∈ X .
While our examples in Sect. 4 work with E2 we allow for intra-household exter-
nalities in Sects. 3 and 6.
Budget constraints. Now consider a household h and a price system p ∈ R. For
xh = (xh1, . . . , xhm(h)) ∈ Xh , denote total household expenditure
p ∗ xh := p ·
⎛
⎝
m(h)∑
m=1
xhm
⎞
⎠ .
Then h’s budget set is defined as Bh(p) = {xh ∈ Xh : p ∗ xh ≤ p · ωh}. We define
the efficient budget set E Bh(p) by: xh = (xh1, . . . , xhm(h)) ∈ E Bh(p) if and only if
xh ∈ Bh(p) and there is no yh ∈ Bh(p) such that
Uhm(yh) ≥ Uhm(xh) for all m = 1, . . . , m(h);
Uhm(yh) > Uhm(xh) for some m = 1, . . . , m(h).
General equilibrium. A competitive equilibrium (among households) is a price sys-
tem p together with an allocation x = (xi ) satisfying
(i) xh ∈ E Bh(p) for h = 1, . . . , n, and
(ii) ∑i xi = ω.
Thus, in a competitive equilibrium among households (p; x), each household makes
an efficient choice under its budget constraint and markets clear.3 Efficient choice by
the household refers to the individual consumption and welfare of its members, not
merely to the aggregate consumption bundle of the household.
3 Negative intra-household externalities allow for the possibility that a household has a bliss point despite
the fact that each household member has monotonic preferences with respect to her individual consumption
(see Haller 2000 for examples). If this happens, the social feasibility or market clearing condition (ii) has
to be replaced by the free disposal condition ∑i xi ≤ ω.
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Nash bargaining. An efficient household choice under a budget constraint may be
the outcome of maximizing a function of the form
Wh(xh) = Sh
(
Uh1(xh), . . . ,Uhm(h)(xh)
)
,
subject to the budget constraint. A special case thereof is a Nash-bargained household
decision. In this case, Sh assumes the form
Sh
(
Uh1, . . . ,Uhm(h)
) =
m(h)∏
m=1
Uαhmhm , (1)
with the provision that αhm ≥ 0 and Uhm ≥ 0 for m = 1, . . . , m(h). The bar-
gaining weight αhm measures the relative bargaining power of individual i = hm
within household h. In the sequel, we shall concentrate on two-person households, i.e.
m(h) = 2. We assume αh1, αh2 > 0 and αh1 + αh2 = 1.
The assumption of Nash-bargained and, hence, efficient household decisions serves
us well for the present inquiry into the consequences of shifts of bargaining power.
The empirical question of whether collective household decisions are Nash-bargained,
indeed, has gotten a fair amount of attention, in particular in the debate between
Chiappori (1988b, 1991) on the one side and McElroy and Horney (1981, 1990) on
the other side (see Bergstrom 1997 for discussions). There has been a growing number
of empirical studies performing empirical tests of the collective rationality approach
which nests Nash bargaining models as particular cases (Udry 1996; Fortin and Lacroix
1997; Browning and Chiappori 1998; Chiappori et al. 2002, among others).
Two qualifying comments are warranted. First, the interpretation of the maximands
of Sh as Nash-bargained outcomes assumes that for each member of a multi-person
household, the individual’s reservation utility level is zero. The choice of disagreement
points for intra-household bargaining is somewhat controversial and depends on the
assumed inside or outside options of household members. Therefore, we opt here for
a price-independent reservation utility which we normalize to zero solely for com-
putational convenience. In Sect. 6, however, we discuss the extension of our model
to price dependent outside options and indicate that they do not alter the qualitative
implications.
Second, although maximization of the Nash product (1) describes the way in which
the household reaches an efficient collective decision, it would be a grave mistake to
attribute further meaning to the maximal value of (1) and to changes of it. Norma-
tive statements always refer to individuals, either one by one, identifying gainers and
losers, or as constituents of society. Pareto-optimality and Pareto-improvements are
defined in the standard fashion.
The economies and corresponding examples in the paper all have locally unique
competitive equilibria and possess the budget exhaustion property which stipulates
that each household’s efficient choices under its budget constraint lie on the house-
hold’s “budget line”. Haller (2000) shows the validity of the first welfare theorem for
economies with the budget exhaustion property. Therefore, equilibrium allocations are
Pareto-optimal and comparative statics moves the economy from one Pareto-optimum
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to another one. Consequently, if a household member gains from a shift in bargaining
power, then someone else inside or outside the household must lose.
3 General comparative statics for a two-person household
In this section, we perform comparative statics with respect to the balance of bargaining
power within a two-person household denoted by h. We allow for an arbitrary number
of commodities and we consider the general case of intra-household externalities. The
entire population consists of an arbitrary number, n of households.
3.1 Preliminaries
We shall perform comparative statics with respect to the bargaining weights within a
select two-person household h, with members h1 and h2. Whenever convenient and
unambiguous, we shall drop the household name and simply refer to consumers 1 and
2. Without restriction, we may also assume that our selected household has the lowest
number, i.e. h = 1 and the other households are labelled k = 2, . . . , n. For the sake
of convenience, we shall further adopt the notation α = αh1 and 1 − α = αh2 so
that comparative statics can be performed with respect to the parameter α ∈ (0, 1).
Finally, denote F ≡ ln Sh . Explicitly, we obtain
F = F(U1(xh),U2(xh);α) = α ln U1(xh) + (1 − α) ln U2(xh). (2)
While α is treated as variable, the other characteristics of household h as well as all
the characteristics of the rest of the households remain fixed. Each household k = h
is assumed to choose an efficient consumption plan, xk ∈ E B(p). It may, but need
not, maximize a Nash product.
We assume sufficient regularity in the sense that for each α ∈ (0, 1) the economy
has an equilibrium (p(α); x(α)) satisfying:
(iii) local uniqueness and
(iv) continuous differentiability in α.
For each α, at the given price system p(α), household h solves the problem
max F(U1(xh),U2(xh);α) s.t. p(α)[(x1 + x2) − ωh] ≤ 0. (3)
The corresponding solution is xh(α) = (x1(α), x2(α)). The budget constraint can be
rewritten xh ∈ Bh(p(α)). In turn the household budget set Bh(p(α)) defines a set
V(α) of feasible utility allocations for household h, given the price system p(α):
V(α) ≡ {(V1, V2) ∈ R2 : (V1, V2) = (U1(xh),U2(xh)) for some xh ∈ Bh(p(α))}
In the sequel, the term Pareto frontier refers to the Pareto frontier of V(α) in the space
of utility allocations for the household. In particular, (U1(xh(α), U2(xh(α)) lies on the
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Pareto frontier and solves the problem
max F(V1, V2;α) s.t. (V1, V2) ∈ V(α). (4)
Finally, for the household under consideration and a given α, the term α-indifference
curve refers to a locus in R2 given by an identity F(V1, V2;α) ≡ const.
It is instructive to look first at the case  = 1 of a single good. Assuming that
the equilibrium price is positive, the household’s budget set and, therefore, its Pareto
frontier is price-independent and the household’s consumption decision is reduced to
the division of a given pie. Consider an increase from α to α + . Then there are only
two possibilities. It can happen that
(U1(xh(α)),U2(xh(α))) = (U1(xh(α + )),U2(xh(α + )))
because of a kinked Pareto frontier or a corner solution. But whenever
(U1(xh(α)),U2(xh(α))) = (U1(xh(α + )),U2(xh(α + ))),
consumer 1 benefits from her increased bargaining power to the detriment of consumer
2. This follows from the fact that an increase in 1’s bargaining power, that is, in α,
renders the household’s α-indifference curves steeper.
3.2 Bargaining and price effects
We focus on binding budget constraints. At the solution xh(α) = (x1(α), x2(α)) of
the household’s problem (4) the equation
∂F
∂U1
· Dxi U1 +
∂F
∂U2
· Dxi U2 = λ(α)p(α), (5)
with positive Lagrange multiplier λ(α) holds for i = 1, 2.
For the value function
(α) ≡ F(U1(xh(α)),U2(xh(α));α), (6)
we obtain
′(α) =
2∑
i=1
[
∂F
∂U1
· Dxi U1 +
∂F
∂U2
· Dxi U2
]
· x ′i (α) +
∂F
∂α
. (7)
From the budget constraint
p(α) · [x1(α) + x2(α) − ωh] ≡ 0,
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we obtain
p(α)
[
x ′1(α) + x ′2(α)
] = −p′(α) [x1(α) + x2(α) − ωh]. (8)
Substituting (5) and (8) into (7) yields
′(α) = ∂F
∂α
− λ(α)p′(α)[x1(α) + x2(α) − ωh]. (9)
Without further qualification, it is impossible to sign ′(α). Under additional assump-
tions, however, one can gain some detailed insights. To this end, let us decompose the
effects of a change of consumer 1’s relative bargaining power from α to α +  into
two parts:
1. a pure bargaining effect when α is changed to α +  whereas the price system
stays at p(α);
2. a price effect when relative bargaining power remains constant at α +  while the
price system adjusts from p(α) to p(α + ).4
In Eq. (9), p′(α) reflects the price effect.
3.3 Negligible price effects
In this subsection, we examine the case when the price effect is negligible, i.e.
p′(α)≈ 0.5 Then we obtain from Eq. (9), up to the negligible price effect:
′(α) = ∂F
∂α
= ln U1(xh(α)) − ln U2(xh(α)). (10)
We can exploit the following immediate consequence of Eq. (10):
Fact 1 The value function increases (decreases) in α, if U1 > U2 (U1 < U2).
However, this result alone does not allow the further conclusion that the utility of at
least one household member increases (decreases). A look at a more elementary proof
of the fact proves instructive. Namely, let without loss of generality U1 > U2 > 0
and consider α and  with 0 < α < α +  < 1. Then for sufficiently small ,
xh(α) ∈ Bh(p(α + )) and
4 Of course, the price effect could be further decomposed into a substitution and an income effect. But that
is immaterial to our analysis.
5 Note that the price effect vanishes when the budget constraint is not binding.
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[U1(xh(α + ))]α+ · [U2(xh(α + ))]1−(α+)
≥ [U1(xh(α))]α+ · [U2(xh(α))]1−(α+)
= [U1(xh(α))]α · [U2(xh(α))]1−α · (U1/U2)
> [U1(xh(α))]α · [U2(xh(α))]1−α.
The last inequality shows that the shift in bargaining power has a “nominal effect”
on the household’s Nash product even before reoptimization takes place. For this
reason, we cannot conclude from a surge of the household’s maximum value of F per
se that the utility of at least one household member has increased. The impact of a
shift of bargaining power has to be assessed for each household member individually.
In order to sign individual utility changes, we focus on Eq. (5) which is the key to
the pure bargaining effect. With DU j = (Dx1U j , Dx2U j ) for j = 1, 2, let us rewrite
(5) as
α
U1
· DU1 = −1 − αU2 · DU2 + λ(α)(p(α), p(α)). (11)
Now consider a change xh away from xh(α) while maintaining the budget iden-
tity, i.e. p(α)∗(xh(α)+xh) = p(α)∗xh(α) = p(α)ωh . Then (p(α), p(α)) ·xh =
p(α) ∗ xh = 0, hence with (11),
[
α
U1
· DU1
]
· xh = −
[
1 − α
U2
· DU2
]
· xh. (12)
We first examine local comparative statics. One possibility is (U1(xh(α)),
U2(xh(α))) = (U1(xh(α+)),U2(xh(α+))). The second possibility is (U1(xh(α)),
U2(xh(α)) = (U1(xh(α + )),2 (xh(α + ))). An increase of α makes the house-
hold’s α-indifference curves steeper. Hence, as long as xh(α + ) ∈ Bh(p(α)) and
xh(α) ∈ Bh(p(α + )), the revised utility allocation (U1(xh(α + )),U2(xh(α + )))
must lie to the southeast of (U1(xh(α)),U2(xh(α)). Thus consumer 1 benefits from a
small increase of her bargaining power to the detriment of consumer 2. The foregoing
local comparative statics can be easily globalized.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the price effect is negligible. If 0 < α∗ < α∗ < 1, then
one of the following two assertions holds:
(i) U1(xh(α∗)) = U1(xh(α∗)), U2(xh(α∗)) = U2(xh(α∗)).
(ii) U1(xh(α∗)) < U1(xh(α∗)), U2(xh(α∗)) > U2(xh(α∗)).
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the appendix. The focus on a particular
household h amid many might suggest that shifts of bargaining power are sporadic
and therefore price effects are likely to be negligible. Our analysis so far provides
valuable insights in case the change of bargaining power is a sporadic event, indeed.
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Drastic price effects will prevail for instance, if the economy is replicated and the
same shift in bargaining power occurs in all households that are replicas of h. If the
price effect is drastic, both utilities may move in the same direction. The price effect
also depends on preferences, including the preferences of consumers not belonging to
the household as we will discuss next.
4 Comparative statics with drastic price effects
In this section, we allow for drastic price effects and consider a series of examples. The
entire population consists of a total of three consumers, two belonging to household
h and one forming a one-person household denoted k. To capture widespread shifts
in bargaining power in a large finite population, one can consider h as a prototype of
a two-person household and k as representative of a one-person household. Literally,
one can think in terms of replica economies derived from the basic economies under
consideration, with an equal number of two-person households like h and one-person
households like k.
Throughout this section, there are always two goods:  = 2. The second good serves
as numéraire. The symbols x, x1, x2, . . . , xi , . . . denote quantities of the first good.
The symbols y, y1, y2, . . . , yi , . . . denote quantities of the second good. c∗i stands for
the equilibrium consumption bundle of a generic person (individual, consumer) i . All
consumers fulfill condition E2, i.e., absence of externalities. To simplify the exposition
of the later examples, we consider first an auxiliary example of an economy consisting
of two one-person households, g and k. The respective consumers are named 0 and 3.
Example 0
The initial endowments are ω0 = (1, 0) and ω3 = (0, 1). The utility representations
are
u0 = u0(x0, y0) = xα0 y1−α0 , with 0 < α < 1, and
u3 = u3(x3, y3) = x1/23 y1/23 .
After normalizing the price of the second good, market equilibrium is unique. The
equilibrium price system is
p∗ =
(
1
2(1 − α), 1
)
;
the equilibrium consumption bundles are c∗0 = (α, 1/2), c∗3 = (1 − α, 1/2). 
unionsq
Now we are prepared to consider the case of three individuals, labelled i = 1, 2, 3.
Consumers 1 and 2 form the two-person household h. In this household, consumer
1 has bargaining power α and consumer 2 has bargaining power 1 − α. Consumer 3
constitutes the single household k. We are going to scrutinize several representative
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examples which are almost exhaustive in that they exhibit three possible allocative
responses to a shift of bargaining power within the two-person household:
(a) Only one member is affected.
(b) The two members are affected in opposite ways.
(c) Both members are affected in the same way.
The examples differ only in individual consumer preferences. The analysis suggests
that less substitutability leads to more drastic price effects. We start with the following
example of case (a).
Example 1
Here consumer 1 benefits from more bargaining power, to the detriment of consumer
3 while consumer 2 is unaffected. Household h is endowed with ωh = (1, 0). Its two
members, i = 1, 2 have utility representations
u1(x1, y1) = x1 and u2(x2, y2) = y2.
The household maximizes
Sh = uα1 u1−α2 = xα1 y1−α2 , 0 < α < 1.
The characteristics of household k are as in the previous example, that is the endow-
ment is ω3 = (0, 1) and the utility representation is
u3(x3, y3) = x1/23 y1/23 .
Since the aggregate demand function of household h coincides with the demand func-
tion of consumer 0 in Example 0, the equilibrium quantities are
p∗ =
(
1
2(1 − α), 1
)
;
c∗1 = (α, 0) , c∗2 =
(
0,
1
2
)
, c∗3 =
(
1 − α, 1
2
)
.
Hence as asserted consumer 1 benefits from more bargaining power, to the detriment
of consumer 3. Consumer 2 is unaffected. 
unionsq
In the example, the first good becomes more valuable to the two-person household
as the bargaining power of the first consumer increases. This boosts the equilibrium
price of the first good and the income of the two-person household endowed with the
first good. The household has become richer both in nominal and real terms. Since
the expenditure on the second good remains constant, the second consumer is unaf-
fected. But the increase in the residual income to be spent on the first good more than
compensates for the higher price: consumer 1 is better off as a consequence of her
increased bargaining power. As for consumer 3, his nominal income derived from the
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possession of the second resource remains constant. Therefore, he has become poorer,
has less purchasing power.
From consumer 2’s perspective, if bargaining power shifts towards her and prices
are fixed, then her welfare is increased. But the resulting price variation offsets her
gain. That consumer 2 is unaffected by a change in bargaining power seems to be
caused by limited substitutability within the two-person household. This is confirmed
by the next example where enhanced bargaining power of consumer 1 translates into
improved welfare for this consumer and welfare losses for consumers 2 and 3.
Example 2
Here consumer 1 benefits from more bargaining power to the detriment of consumer 2.
Consumer 3 either gains or loses. Household h is still endowed with ωh = (1, 0). But
now each member i = 1, 2 has Cobb–Douglas preferences with utility representation
ui (xi , yi ) = xγii y1−γii , 0 < γi < 1.
The household maximizes
uα1 u
1−α
2 = (xγ11 y1−γ11 )α(xγ22 y1−γ22 )1−α
= xαγ11 x (1−α)γ22 yα(1−γ1)1 y(1−α)(1−γ2)2 .
Again, α and 1 − α lend themselves as measures of relative bargaining power of con-
sumer 1 and consumer 2, respectively. Household k has the single member 3, with the
same consumer characteristics as before. We obtain:
Fact 2 A shift of bargaining power from consumer 2 to consumer 1 benefits consumer
1 and harms consumer 2, who ends up consuming less of both commodities.
The proof of Fact 2 is given in the appendix. In Example 2 there is more substitut-
ability in the economy than in Example 1.
Example 3 below exhibits less substitutability than Example 1, because the pref-
erences of consumer 3 will be altered from Cobb-Douglas to Leontieff. It turns out
that the lack of substitution by consumer 3 necessitates a major price adjustment to
re-equilibrate the market after bargaining power within household h has shifted. As
a result, we observe a very drastic price effect: When bargaining power within their
household changes, the equilibrium utilities of consumers 1 and 2 are moving in the
same direction.
The example further shows that the aggregate equilibrium consumption of a house-
hold can be positively affected by a shift of internal bargaining power. This suggests the
possibility that a sophisticated household might succeed in an attempt to manipulate
the market outcome, not by misrepresenting endowments or individual preferences,
but by misrepresenting the internal bargaining power. To illustrate this novel way of
manipulation, which is not yet documented in the literature, suppose the household
pretends that the bargaining power of the first consumer is higher than it actually is
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and they submit the corresponding excess demands to the market. If γ1 > γ2, i.e. if
the first good is relatively more important to the first consumer, they will end up with
a higher aggregate amount of the first good and the same amount of the second good
in equilibrium. Whether or not both gain from a successful manipulation depends on
the internal distribution of aggregate consumption. If they divided the goods in accor-
dance with their pretended bargaining power, put their money where their mouth is,
then consumer 1 would gain and consumer 2 would lose from manipulation. If they
divide the goods according to the true bargaining power—which fixes a proportional
sharing rule for each of the goods—then both gain from manipulation.6
Example 3
Here a shift of bargaining power from consumer 2 to consumer 1 benefits both con-
sumers to the detriment of consumer 3. This example is identical with Example 1,
except that consumer 3 now has Leontief preferences with utility representation
u3(x3, y3) = min(x3, y3).
After setting s = min(x3, y3), the utility maximization problem for consumer 3 can
be rewritten as
max s s.t. (p1 + 1)s = 1
with solution s = 1/(p1 + 1).
Household h’s demand is (α, (1 − α)p1). Therefore, market clearing for the first
good requires 1/(p1 + 1) = 1 − α. Thus in equilibrium,
p∗ = (α/(1 − α), 1);
c∗1 = (α, 0), c∗2 = (0, α), c∗3 = (1 − α, 1 − α).
Thus a shift of bargaining power from consumer 2 to consumer 1 benefits both mem-
bers of the household to the detriment of consumer 3. A reverse shift harms 1 and 2,
and leaves 3 better off. 
unionsq
The examples suggest that comparative statics is sensitive to the degree of substi-
tutability in the economy. Enhanced substitutability appears to mitigate price effects.
Indeed, if in a further variation of Example 1, one assumes linear preferences (per-
fect substitutability) for consumer 3, with utility representation u3(x3, y3) = x3 + y3,
then the price effect is zero. Moreover, for two-good economies exhibiting CES-utility
functions for all individuals with the same elasticity of substitution, the magnitude of
the price effect can be parameterized by the elasticity of substitution in the economy.
The price effect depends negatively on the elasticity of substitution.
6 We will later show that this kind of manipulation is excluded when all individuals have quasi-linear
preferences.
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The preceding examples have not contained any sort of externalities. It is straight-
forward yet space- and time-consuming to analyze the same examples with additive
group externalities, i.e. each household member obtains a fixed utility gain from living
together, and price-dependent outside options. The qualitative results remain the same.
5 Comparative statics across households
Until now we have focused primarily on intra-household effects, that is, on the utility
changes in a particular household when bargaining power shifts within that household.
Via a series of examples, we have demonstrated that such a shift of bargaining power
can affect the members of the corresponding two-person household in three different
ways: Only one member is affected; the two members are affected in opposite ways;
both members are affected the same way. We have argued earlier that the above exam-
ples can be readily reinterpreted as instances of widespread shifts of bargaining power
in a replica economy. In the resulting replica economy, the main focus remains on
intra-household effects, on the repercussions on the members of those households in
which a shift in bargaining power has occurred. However, we have also seen that third
parties can be affected. In this section, we redirect our attention to such inter-household
or spill-over effects.
We start with the quasi-linear case that can serve as a benchmark.
5.1 The quasi-linear case
We consider a society with n > 1 identical households. Household h (h = 1, . . . , n)
has members h1 and h2, called the first member and the second member, respectively.
There are  goods ( > 1). The consumption of good k (k = 1, . . . , ) by individual hi
(i = 1, 2) is denoted by xkhi . Each household h is endowed with wh = (w1h, . . . , wh).
The two members of household h have quasi-linear utility representations of the form
Uh1(xh1) = uh1(x1h1, . . . , x−1h1 ) + xh1 (13)
Uh2(xh2) = uh2(x1h2, . . . , x−1h2 ) + xh2 (14)
where uhi is assumed to be strictly concave, strictly increasing and differentiable.
Household h maximizes
Sh = Uαhh1 U 1−αhh2 or ln Sh = αh ln Uh1 + (1 − αh) ln Uh2 (15)
where 0 < αh < 1 is the bargaining power of individual h1 in household h. We denote
equilibrium values by xˆ khi and equilibrium utilities by Uˆhi and uˆhi . For the following
we assume that for any array of bargaining power parameters (α1, . . . , αn) under con-
sideration, each individual consumes a non-negative amount of the natural numéraire
good  in every market equilibrium. We also assume that for any array (α1, . . . , αn),
the corresponding economy has a unique market equilibrium, up to price normaliza-
tion. These two assumptions are inessential for our argumentation but simplify the
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exposition considerably. We shall indicate below which modifications are necessary if
the two assumptions are removed. We consider a market equilibrium and parametric
changes of the bargaining power in household h and obtain:
Proposition 2 (No spill-overs) With quasi-linear preferences:
(i) A change of αh in a particular household h does not impact on non-members.
(ii) ∂ xˆ
k
h1
∂αh
= ∂ xˆ kh2
∂αh
= 0 for all k = 1, . . . ,  − 1.
(iii) ∂ xˆ

h1
∂αh
> 0, ∂ xˆ

h2
∂αh
< 0.
(iv) Suppose that households are homogeneous with respect to individual utility
representations and household endowments, with wh = w, ∀h = 1, . . . , n.
Then:
xˆh1 = αhw + αh uˆh2 − (1 − αh)uˆh1;
xˆh2 = (1 − αh)w + (1 − αh) uˆh1 − αh uˆh2.
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the appendix. Proposition 2 illustrates that
with quasi-linear preferences, a change of the bargaining power within a particular
household only impacts on the distribution of the numéraire in household h without
affecting the consumption of the first −1 commodities. A local change of bargaining
power has no price effect and does not affect the utility of individuals in other house-
holds. This also means that a household h cannot manipulate outcomes and possibly
improve utility of household members at the expense of outsiders by misrepresenting
internal bargaining power.
Regarding our simplifying assumptions for the neutrality result, interiority and
uniqueness of equilibrium, giving up the first assumption requires to work with Kuhn–
Tucker conditions instead of first-order conditions. Without the second assumption,
multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out. But a market clearing price system
(p1, . . . , p−1, 1) with respect to some array of bargaining power parameters is also
market clearing with respect to all other arrays. Given any such market clearing price
system and the associated equilibrium selection, the conclusion of Proposition 2 con-
tinues to hold.
5.2 Individually preferred goods
We next turn to situations where internal bargaining power changes in a particular
household have spill-over effects on other households. In particular, we examine how
individuals are affected if similar (dissimilar) persons in other households can increase
their bargaining power. We examine an economy like in the last subsection, but with
different individual preferences. We assume households which are homogeneous at
the beginning but undergo large sociological changes thereafter. We assume  = 2 and
that all households have the same endowment wh = w = (w1, w2)  0. Individuals
in a household h demand different goods, namely:
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Uh1(x1h1, x
2
h1) = Uh1(x1h1),
Uh2(x1h2, x
2
h2) = Uh2(x2h2).
Specifically, individual h1 has a preference for good 1 and demands only that good
and h2 has a preference for good 2 and demands only good 2. The utility functions are
assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave and differentiable. The assumption
of household members demanding different goods is one convenient way to divide the
society into different sociological groups where individuals are similar within a group
and dissimilar across groups. Here we have two groups, “first members” (denoted h1)
and “second members” (denoted h2) of households. Again household h maximizes
Sh = Uαhh1 U 1−αhh2
where 0 < αh < 1. We obtain, with ˆ denoting again equilibrium values:
Proposition 3 (Spill-overs) When household members demand different goods, there
exists a unique market equilibrium (up to price normalization) for each array
(α1, . . . , αn) of bargaining power parameters. Moreover, for any two households
g = h:
(i) αh > αg ⇒ xˆ1h1 > xˆ1g1.
(ii) αh = αg ⇒ xˆ1h1 = xˆ1g1.
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the appendix. In the special case where
Uh1(x1h1) = (x1h1)β1 and Uh2(x2h2) = (x2h2)β2 with β1, β2 ∈ (0, 1), further conclusions
can be drawn: (iii) ∂ xˆ1h1/∂αh > 0, ∂ xˆ1g1/∂αh < 0; (iv) ∂ xˆ2h2/∂αh < 0, ∂ xˆ2g2/∂αh > 0.
Proposition 3 has clear-cut implications. Consider the sociological groups “first-
members” and “second-members”, defined by similarities with respect to preferences.
If all individuals in the first sociological group have the same bargaining power (and as
a consequence all “second-members” as well), all households consume their endow-
ments since we are in an equilibrium with no active trade. An identical shift of bar-
gaining power across all households has no effect on utilities of any individual either
since we will again arrive at an equilibrium with no trade.
The situation is completely different when only some members of a sociologi-
cal group enjoy higher bargaining power. For instance, a “first-member” suffers when
only other “first-members” gain more bargaining power in their respective households.
Conversely, the “first-member” benefits from higher own bargaining power as long as
other “first-members” do not experience a change of bargaining power. The analogue
holds for the other sociological group. Therefore, the main thrust of Proposition 3 is
that an individual tends to benefit if he can increase his bargaining power but tends to
suffer if some or all individuals with the same demand are able to do the same.7
For economies of the type discussed in the current subsection, we obtain as an imme-
diate consequence a power illusion phenomenon. Consider two economies denoted
7 Gersbach and Haller (2005, subsection 5.3) illustrate the assertions and implications of Proposition 3 by
solving explicitly for the market equilibria of a specific numerical example.
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by E1({α1h}n1) and E2({α2h}n1) with households that are homogeneous with respect to
individual utility functions and endowments. Household members demand different
goods. Equilibrium utilities are denoted by Uˆ 1h1, Uˆ 1h2 and Uˆ 2h1, Uˆ 2h2, respectively. Then
the following holds:
Corollary 1 (Power illusion)
(i) If α1h = α1 for all h and α21 > maxh =1{α2h}, then Uˆ 111 < Uˆ 211.
(ii) If α1h = α1 for all h and α21 < minh =1{α2h}, then Uˆ 111 > Uˆ 211.
The corollary illustrates that a member of a sociological group is better off if he has
the highest internal bargaining power even if the level of his power is much smaller
than in another economy where all individuals of the group have the same bargaining
power, that is α1 > α21. The underlying intuition runs as follows: Diversity across
households opens trade opportunities. The gains from trade will, as a rule, accrue pri-
marily to the members of a sociological group who have relatively higher bargaining
power than other members of the group. The absolute level of bargaining power is
not important. When, however, the bargaining power of other individuals in the same
sociological group is enhanced as well and all individuals of the sociological group end
up enjoying an identical level in bargaining power, the original gain is totally eroded.
5.3 Separable utility
In this section we consider in which way Proposition 3 can be generalized. We again
assume  = 2 and that all households have the same endowment wh = w¯ = (w¯1, w¯2).
Each household consists of two members: the first member (denoted h1) and the sec-
ond member (denoted h2). Individuals in a household h have utility functions
Uh1(x1h1, x
2
h1) = U 1h1(x1h1)U 2h1(x2h1);
Uh2(x1h2, x
2
h2) = U 1h2(x1h2)U 2h2(x2h2).
The functions U 1h1(·), U 2h1(·), U 1h2(·), and U 2h2(·) are strictly increasing, strictly con-
cave and differentiable. Moreover, the marginal utility of consuming good 1 and good
2 at zero is infinite for both household members. A typical example are Cobb–Douglas
utility functions. Household h maximizes
Sh = Uαhh1 U 1−αhh2
where 0 < αh < 1. We obtain, withˆdenoting equilibrium values:
Proposition 4 There exists a unique market equilibrium for each array (α1, . . . , αn)
of bargaining parameters. Moreover, for any two households g = h:
(i) αh > αg ⇒ xˆ1h1 > xˆ1g1, xˆ2h1 > xˆ2g1.
(ii) αh = αg ⇒ xˆ1h1 = xˆ1g1, xˆ2h1 = xˆ2g1.
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The proof of Proposition 4 is available upon request. Proposition 4 states that if a
member of a particular sociological group has higher bargaining power in his house-
hold than another member of the sociological group in another household, he will
consume more of both commodities.
Notice that Proposition 4 does not imply an analogue of Corollary 1. Instead, we are
going to illustrate two other properties of the model with separable utilities. First, sup-
pose all individuals in the first sociological group have the same bargaining power and
thus there is no trade. An identical upward shift of their bargaining power will again
arrive at an equilibrium with no trade. However, all individuals in the first sociological
group benefit from the shift as they will consume more of both goods.8 Second, spill-
overs from a upward shift of bargaining power for a “first-member” in one household
can affect other first-members in other households in different ways. Let us consider
as a benchmark case the following corollary.
Corollary 2 (Absence of spillovers) Suppose αh = αg ∀h, g h = g. Let w¯1 = w¯2
and U 1h1(·) ≡ U 2h1(·) ≡ U 1h2(·) ≡ U 2h2(·). Then a change of the bargaining power in
one household does not affect the utilities of other households.
The corollary follows from the observation that the first good’s equilibrium price
of this economy before and after the bargaining change is p1 = 1—with the second
good as numéraire. At any other price all households would have an excess demand
for the first or second good.9 Given that the equilibrium price is not affected by a
change of bargaining power in a particular household, the assertion in Corollary 2
follows immediately. It is straightforward to construct examples using Cobb-Douglas
utility functions with different exponents for first- and second-members where first-
members are affected negatively or positively by the change of bargaining power in
other households.
6 Price-dependent outside options and group externalities
In this section, we discuss how the model can be extended to price-dependent outside
options and group externalities. A simple yet very instructive extension is to intro-
duce an exit option, i.e. the possibility that a household member leaves and forms
a single household at the going market prices. Such price-dependent exit options
can easily be integrated into our analysis and have been pursued in more detail in
Gersbach and Haller (2008).10 To this end we define: a competitive equilibrium with
free exit (CEFE) is a price system p together with an allocation x = (xi ) satisfying
(i) xh ∈ E Bh(p) for all h = 1, . . . , n.
(ii) ∑i xi = ω.
8 This follows from the first-order conditions in the proof of Proposition 4.
9 This follows from inspecting the first-order conditions. Details are available upon request.
10 Another and more general approach, suggested by a referee, would be to take a collective model in
which decisions are assumed to be Pareto efficient, Pareto weights may be price-dependent and a change
of such weights is considered (see Blundell et al. 2005).
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(v) There are no current household h, household member i ∈ h and consumption
bundle yi ∈ B{i}(p) such that Ui (yi ) > Ui (xh; h).
Here Ui (yi ) denotes i’s utility from consuming the bundle yi as a single individual.
Individual i has an endowment ω{i} and budget set B{i}(p) = {xi ∈ Xi | pxi ≤ pω{i}}
when forming the single household {i}. In contrast, Ui (xh; h) denotes i’s utility when i
stays in the multi-member household h and household consumption is xh = (x j ) j∈h ∈
Xh . This formulation allows for consumption externalities, where i’s welfare depends
on the consumption bundles x j of other household members j ∈ h, j = i , and
for group externalities, where household member i’s welfare depends on household
composition, that is on h.
In the specific context of Nash bargained household decisions, a CEFE amounts
to replacing (1) by
Sh
(
Uh1, . . . ,Uhm(h)
) =
m(h)∏
m=1
(
Uhm − V ohm(p)
)αhm
where V ohm(p) is individual hm’s indirect utility in the single person household {hm} at
price system p. This formulation presumes a non-empty set of feasible utility vectors
(Uh1, . . . ,Uhm(h))  (V oh1(p), . . . , V ohm(h)(p)) over which Sh is maximized.
With this formulation, (5) remains unchanged while (7) becomes
′(α) =
2∑
i=1
[
∂F
∂U1
· Dxi U1 +
∂F
∂U2
· Dxi U2
]
· x ′i (α)
−
[
∂F
∂U1
· dV
o
1
dp
+ ∂F
∂U2
· dV
o
2
dp
]
· p′(α) + ∂F
∂α
and (9) becomes
′(α) = ∂F
∂α
− p′(α)
[
∂F
∂U1
· dV
o
1
dp
+ ∂F
∂U2
· dV
o
2
dp
]
−λ(α)p′(α)[x1(α) + x2(α) − ωh].
It follows that Proposition 1 generalizes to this case of price-dependent reservation
utilities of the form V oi (p) where the latter is individual i’s indirect utility in the single
person household {i} at price system p. A proof of the more general result is omitted.
It is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1 but more tedious.
Now let us specialize and consider two-person households h = {h1, h2} with pure
group externalities as follows: Individual hm, m = 1, 2 has utility of the form
Uhm(xhm) = uhm(xhm) for xhm ∈ Xhm when single;
Uhm(xhm; h) = uhm(xhm) + vm for xhm ∈ Xhm when a member of h
where vm > 0. As mentioned at the end of Sect. 4, the qualitative properties of
Examples 1–3 remain the same if this type of additive pure group externalities and
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price-dependent reservation utilities are incorporated. However, the numerical analysis
becomes lengthier and more cumbersome.
Next we examine the robustness of the results of Sects. 5.1 and 5.2 vis-à-vis this type
of additive pure group externalities and price-dependent reservation utilities. Again,
the qualitative results tend to remain the same.
6.1 The quasi-linear case revisited
Here we provide a specific example with quasi-linear utilities and pure group external-
ities. Like in Sect. 5.1, we consider a society with n > 1 identical two-member house-
holds h = 1, . . . , n. Household h has members h1 and h2. There are  > 1 goods.
The consumption of good k = 1, . . . ,  by individual hm, 1 ≤ h ≤ n, m = 1, 2, is
denoted xkhm . The vector xhm = (x1hm, . . . , xhm) denotes hm’s consumption bundle.
Each household h is endowed with wh = (w1h, . . . , wh) ∈ R++. The two members,
h1 and h2, of household h have quasi-linear utility representations of the form
Uh1(xh1; h) = uh1(x1h1, . . . , x−1h1 ) + xh1 + v1, (16)
Uh2(xh2; h) = uh2(x1h2, . . . , x−1h2 ) + xh2 + v2, (17)
where uhm is assumed to be strictly concave, strictly increasing and differentiable. The
parameters v1 and v2 (v1 > 0, v2 > 0) capture the group externalities that individuals
h1 and h2 experience when living together. As single consumer, individual hm has an
endowment whm ∈ R++ and the utility function
Uhm(xhm) = uhm(x1hm, . . . , x−1hm ) + xhm .
Hence uhm(xhm) = uhm(x1hm, . . . , x−1hm ) + xhm and, with the notation of Sect. 5.1,
V ohm(p) = Uhm(x0hm(p)). Household h now maximizes
Sh = {Uh1(xh1; h) − Uh1(x0h1(p))}αh · {Uh2(xh2; h) − Uh2(x0h2(p))}1−αh (18)
subject to its budget constraint plus the constraints Uh1(xh1; h) − Uh1(x0h1(p)) > 0
and Uh2(xh2; h) − Uh2(x0h2(p)) > 0, where 0 < αh < 1 is the bargaining power of
individual h1 in household h. The functions x0h1(p) and x0h2(p) denote consumer h1’s
and h2’s individual demands at the price system p when they are singles.
Price-dependent outside options limit the feasible allocations in a household as
members leave if they are better off as singles. However, as shown in Gersbach and
Haller (2008) the first three results of Proposition 2 still hold if outside options are
price-dependent. It is obvious that group externalities have the following further con-
sequences. If individual h1 gains relatively more from living in household h, i.e. when
v1 increases, he receives less of the numéraire good. But the net effect on utility is
positive. Hence, both individuals benefit. The same effects occur when v2 increases.
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6.2 Individually preferred goods revisited
Here we consider instances of individually preferred goods and pure group external-
ities. Like in Sect. 5.2, we assume a society with two goods and n > 1 identical
two-member households h = 1, . . . , n. Household members hm have a preference
for good m = 1, 2 only so that
uhm(x
1
hm, x
2
hm) = Uhm(xmhm).
As before, we assume that all households have the same endowment wh = w =
(w1, w2)  0. With pure group externalities and price-dependent outside options,
Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 still obtain, as an inspection of the proof reveals.
However, even though the qualitative effects of certain changes in bargaining power
do not depend on the outside options, the quantitative effects can depend on the specific
price-dependent reservation utilities V ohm . To accentuate the differential quantitative
impact of a change in bargaining power under different outside options, we consider
two specific cases with individually preferred goods and pure group externalities. First
let us consider case 1 where as a single, an mth household member is endowed with
his or her preferred good only, specifically wh1 = (w1, 0) and wh2 = (0, w2). Then
V ohm(p) = Uhm(wm). Hence in this particular case, the price-dependent reservation
utilities turn out to be constant. In case 2, when single each individual is endowed
only with the good preferred by the other group, specifically wh1 = (0, w2) and
wh2 = (w1, 0).
In both cases, Proposition 3 holds. Thus, in cases 1 and 2 (and in other cases), the
qualitative responses to particular changes in bargaining power are identical. However,
the quantitative impact of a change of bargaining power can differ. For the sake of
direct comparison, assume instances of case 1 and case 2 with the same primitive
data except for the differences in individual endowments. Further assume that there
exists an array of bargaining power parameters such that α1 = α2 = · · · = αn and
at the corresponding equilibrium price system p̂ for case 2, V ohm( p̂) = Uhm(wm)
holds for all hm—which can be achieved with suitably chosen model parameters.
Then for the particular array of bargaining power parameters, case 1 and case 2
have identical equilibrium outcomes.
Now take one of the two-member households h = {h1, h2} and ceteris paribus con-
sider an increase of αh . Then in case 1 and in case 2, consumption of h1 increases
and consumption of h2 decreases. But maintaining market clearing while xˆ1h1 increases
requires that some other first household member g1 consumes less. By assumption, αg
has not changed. Hence, the relative price of good 1 must have risen. Consequently, in
case 2, V oh1 must have fallen (increasing the utility differential Uh1 − V oh1) and Vh2
must have risen (reducing Uh2 −V oh2). In contrast, the reservation utilities are constant
in case 1. This implies that the equilibrium consumption xˆ1h1 increases less and the
equilibrium consumption xˆ2h2 decreases less in case 2 than in case 1. A fortiori, the
impact of the change in αh on all equilibrium values is less in case 2 than in case 1.
The foregoing argument reflects the fact that the left-hand side of the tangency
condition MRSh = p1 contains the price-dependent utility differentials Uh1 − V oh1
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and Uh2 − V oh2. Namely, with price-dependent outside options and prevailing price
system p = (p1, 1), the household’s marginal rate of substitution assumes the form
MRSh = αh · U
′
h1
(1 − αh) · U ′h2
· Uh2 − V
o
h2(p1)
Uh1 − V oh1(p1)
.
7 Concluding remarks
The current analysis is confined to a general equilibrium model of a pure exchange
economy with a fixed household structure and Nash-bargained household decisions
for a select two-person household. General comparative statics as well as numerical
examples lend support to the following conclusions. As a rule, a consumer benefits
from more bargaining power at the expense of her fellow household member and the
other consumer(s). However, in a closed economy, a shift of bargaining power within
a significant number of two-person households may cause drastic price effects. As a
consequence, both members of such a household may benefit from or both members
may be harmed by a shift of internal bargaining power. In exceptional cases, it can
happen that a household member is unaffected.
To reiterate, the current model assumes a fixed household structure and pure
exchange. Removing any of these restrictions leads to a host of new important issues,
which are left to future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Suppose that the price effect is negligible. For everyα ∈ (0, 1),
we can choose an (α) > 0 so that the local comparative statics prevail in the open
neighborhood N (α) ≡ (α − (α), α + (α)). Each set C(α) = N (α) ∩ [α∗, α∗] is
relatively open in the interval [α∗, α∗]. The family C(α), α ∈ [α∗, α∗], is an open
covering of the compact set [α∗, α∗]. It has a finite subcovering. Let us fix a min-
imal finite subcovering C(αk), k = 1, . . . , K . Without loss of generality, assume
α1 < α2 < · · · < αK . We claim that:
(A) If α∗ < α1, then α∗ ∈ C(α1).
(B) If αK < α∗, then α∗ ∈ C(αK ).
(C) For each k ≤ K − 1, there exists βk with αk < βk < αk+1 and βk ∈ C(αk) ∩
C(αk+1).
To show (A), suppose it were false, i.e. α∗ < α1 and α∗ ∈ C(α1). Then there
exists k > 1 with α∗ ∈ C(αk) and, consequently, C(α1) ⊂ C(αk), contradicting the
minimality of the covering. Claims (B) and (C) are shown by similar reasoning.
Now fix β1, . . . , βK−1 according to (C) and let us go from α∗ to α∗ taking small
steps, namely
from α∗ to α1, from α1 to β1,
from β1 to α2, from α2 to β2,
. . . . . . . . . . . .
from βK−1 to αK , and αK to α∗.
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During each step, either the utilities remain unchanged or consumer 1’s utility goes
up and consumer 2’s utility goes down. Hence the assertion. 
unionsq
For convenient reference, we state an obvious auxiliary result before proceeding to
the proof of Fact 2.
Lemma 1 Let real numbers σ, τ, z > 0 be given. The solution of the problem
max zσ1 z
τ
2 s.t. z1 ≥ 0, z2 ≥ 0, z1 + z2 = z
is z1 = σσ+τ · z, z2 = τσ+τ · z, with value
(
σ
σ + τ
)σ
·
(
τ
σ + τ
)τ
· zσ+τ .
Proof of Fact 2 Let x = x1 + x2 and y = y1 + y2 denote the total amounts purchased
by household h. By Lemma 1, maximization of the Nash product uα1 u
1−α
2 requires
x1 = σ
σ + τ · x, x2 =
τ
σ + τ · x,
y1 = σ
∗
σ ∗ + τ ∗ · y, y2 =
τ ∗
σ ∗ + τ ∗ · y
where
σ = αγ1, τ = (1 − α)γ2,
σ ∗ = α(1 − γ1), τ ∗ = (1 − α)(1 − γ2).
Moreover, at the maximum,
uα1 u
1−α
2 =
(
σ
σ + τ
)σ (
τ
σ + τ
)τ (
σ ∗
σ ∗ + τ ∗
)σ ∗ (
τ ∗
σ ∗ + τ ∗
)τ∗
xδy1−δ
with
δ = σ + τ = αγ1 + (1 − α)γ2 = γ2 + α(γ1 − γ2);
1 − δ = σ ∗ + τ ∗ = α(1 − γ1) + (1 − α)(1 − γ2) = 1 − γ2 − α(γ1 − γ2).
Therefore, in equilibrium, the aggregate consumption for household h is (x, y) =
(δ, 12 ). The associated individual shares are
x1 = σ
σ + τ x = σ ;
x2 = τ
σ + τ x = τ ;
y1 = σ
∗
σ ∗ + τ ∗ y =
1
2
σ ∗
σ ∗ + τ ∗ ;
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y2 = τ
∗
σ ∗ + τ ∗ y =
1
2
τ ∗
σ ∗ + τ ∗ .
As a function of α, consumer 1 achieves
u1 = σγ1
(
1
2
)1−γ1 ( σ ∗
σ ∗ + τ ∗
)1−γ1
= const1 · αγ1
(
α
1 − γ2 − (γ1 − γ2)α
)1−γ1
which is increasing in α. Consumer 2 achieves
u2 = τγ2
(
1
2
)1−γ2 ( τ ∗
σ ∗ + τ ∗
)1−γ2
= const2 · (1 − α)γ2
(
1 − α
1 − γ1 − (γ2 − γ1)(1 − α)
)1−γ2
which is decreasing in α. Hence a shift of bargaining power from consumer 2 to con-
sumer 1 benefits consumer 1 and harms consumer 2, who ends up consuming less of
both commodities. 
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 Good  serves as a nume´raire so that the price system assumes
the form (p1, . . . , p−1, 1). We consider the first-order conditions of maximizing Sh
in household h:11
αh
1
Uh1
∂ uh1
∂xkh1
− λh pk = 0, k = 1, . . . ,  − 1;
αh
1
Uh1
− λh = 0;
(1 − αh) 1Uh2 ·
∂ uh2
∂xkh2
− λh pk = 0, k = 1, . . . ,  − 1;
(1 − αh) 1Uh2 − λh = 0.
Therefore
λh = αh 1Uh1 = (1 − αh)
1
Uh2
. (19)
∂ uh1
∂ xkh1
= ∂ uh2
∂ xkh2
= pk, k = 1, . . . ,  − 1. (20)
Because of differentiability and strict concavity, the demand of household h for
commodities k = 1, . . . ,  − 1 is independent of the bargaining power αh and 1 − αh
11 Note that our assumption of sufficient endowments with the numéraire good in all households allows us
to work with the entire set of first-order conditions.
123
Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption 689
of individual h1 and h2, respectively. Hence, by the budget constraint and budget
exhaustion also the aggregate household demand for commodity  is independent of
αh . Therefore, the market clearing price system (p1, . . . , p−1, 1) does not depend on
internal bargaining power of households and, hence, changes of bargaining power in
household h have no effect on other households. This establishes assertions (i) and
(ii).
In contrast to all other goods, a shift of power in household h affects the distribution
of the numéraire good in household h, as we shall establish next. Using the notation
for equilibrium values we obtain from Eq. (19):
αh
uˆh1 + xˆh1
= 1 − αh
uˆh2 + xˆh2
(21)
Since uˆh1 and uˆh2 are independent of αh and xˆh1 + xˆh2 does not depend on αh
either, assertion (iii) follows.
Using again the fact that variations in αh have no effect on aggregate excess demand,
we conclude that if households are completely homogeneous with respect to Uhi and
wh , then a market equilibrium does not exhibit any positive net trades. Therefore,
xˆh1 + xˆh2 = wh and via Eq. (21), we obtain the expressions in (iv). 
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 We normalize prices by p2 = 1. Then the problem of house-
hold h is given by:
max{ln Sh = αh ln Uh1(x1h1) + (1 − αh)ln Uh2(x2h2)}
s.t. x1h1 p1 + x2h2 = w1h p1 + w2h
The first-order conditions amount to:
αh
1
Uh1(x1h1)
U ′h1(x1h1) − λh p1 = 0;
(1 − αh) 1Uh2(x2h2)
U ′h2(x2h2) − λh = 0.
Using the budget constraint and the first-order conditions yields
αh
1
Uh1(x1h1)
U ′h1(x1h1) − (1 − αh)
U ′h2
(
w1h p1 + w2h − x1h1 p1
)
Uh2
(
w1h p1 + w2h − x1h1 p1
) p1 = 0
or
αh
1 − αh F
′
1(x
1
h1) = F ′2
(
w1h p1 + w2h − x1h1 p1
)
· p1 (22)
where F1 ≡ ln Uh1 and F2 ≡ ln Uh2. F ′1 and F ′2 are strictly decreasing functions.
Hence, for a given p1, a higher (equal) αh requires a higher (identical) consumption
of good 1 to preserve (22). This shows (i) and (ii). 
unionsq
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